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AVOIDING DEFERENCE QUESTIONS
Garrick B. Pursley*
I. INTRODUCTION
Preemption doctrine is notoriously muddled. Statutory preemption questions alone
involve a confusion of presumptions, interpretive canons, ever-mutating categories of
"conflict," and vague oaths to congressional intent and the Supremacy Clause.1 But
increasingly, preemption cases involve an additional source of confusion: input from
federal administrative agencies. Agencies greatly outpace Congress in the production of
laws; and they are the day-to-day handlers of most complex federal statutory schemes.
2
So it is not surprising that William Eskridge found that federal agencies offer input to
courts in the vast majority of preemption cases. 3 The most obvious-and perhaps most
difficult-question that agency involvement adds to preemption cases is whether and to
what extent courts should defer to agencies' positions on preemption.
4
The Supreme Court's treatment of the issue in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.5 does not,
at first blush, appear to clarify much. Riegel involved preemption under the Medical
* Assistant Professor, Emerging Scholars Program, The University of Texas School of Law. This Article
is a contribution to the Tulsa Law Review Symposium on decisions from the Supreme Court's October 2007
term. I am grateful to Mitch Berman for the invitation to contribute and for very helpful comments on an
earlier draft. I am also grateful to Lynn Blais, Tom McGarity, and Ernie Young for their comments and
suggestions. And as always I am profoundly grateful to Amber Pursley for continual support and forbearance.
1. On presumptions, see e.g. Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 869, 876-77,
876 n. 45 (2008) (discussing debates on the presumption against preemption). On interpretive canons, see e.g.
Garrick B. Pursley, The Structure of Preemption Decisions, 85 Neb. L. Rev. 912, 937-38 (2007) (noting
various interpretive canons applied in preemption cases). On the varieties of conflict preemption, see e.g.
Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 727, 739 (2008) (observing
"multiple categories of implied preemption, the exact number depending on who is doing the counting.");
Pursley at 926-27 (also noting the focus on congressional intent). On the role of congressional intent, see e.g.
Pursley, supra n. 1, at 926-27 (noting the focus on congressional intent); Merrill, supra n. 1, at 740 (same). On
the role of the Supremacy Clause, see e.g. Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 Cornell L.
Rev. 767, 769 (1994) (observing that "[s]tatements of preemption law almost routinely 'start from the top' with
a reference to the Supremacy Clause").
2. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985-86 (1983) (White, J., dissenting); Merrill, supra n. 1, at 755; see
Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 449,
485-86 (2008).
3. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1441, 1472-73.
1472 n. 144, app. (2008) (reporting that of the 131 cases involving preemption issues decided between the
Court's 1984 and 2005 terms, more than 80 percent involved input from administrative agencies on
preemption).
4. Agency involvement with preemption has its own rich literature. See generally Nina A. Mendelson,
Chevron and Preemption, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 737, 794-95 (2004); Merrill, supra n. 1; Catherine M. Sharkey,
The Fraud Caveat to Agency Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 841 (2008); Young, supra n. 1.
5. 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).
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Device Amendments (MDA) to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, which the FDA
administers. 6 The FDA offered the Court its interpretation of the scope of preemption
under the M!DA in regulations 7 and briefs, 8 but the Court based its decision on the statute
alone, making clear that it was "[n]either accepting nor rejecting the proposition that" the
FDA's views "can properly be consulted to determine the statute's meaning." 9 Though
the Court's language is a bit ambiguous, I think that Riegel may represent a potentially
fruitful rule requiring judicial avoidance of the question of deference to agency inputs in
preemption cases. I explore and defend that rule here.
First, let me make clear what sort of "agency inputs" into preemption I am
concerned about. The preemptive scope of a statute is determined by judgments about
whether, and what kinds of, state laws conflict with the statute and whether such a
conflict is significant enough to warrant preemption. 10  Typically, these are
determinations that courts make, using familiar methods of statutory interpretation. But
more and more, agencies attempt to supplant courts by offering their own interpretations
of the preemptive scope of statutes-which I will call agency "preemption
interpretations."'1 1 If the statute has express preemption language, agency preemption
interpretations may be fairly straightforward constructions of that language. But they
may also be based on any of the forms of conflict-including conflict with the
underlying purposes of a statute-that are recognized as legitimate bases for preemption
in judicial doctrine. 12  And I don't want to focus solely on agency preemption
interpretations that would result in preemption of state law; sometimes agencies offer
interpretations that, if adopted, would save the challenged state law from preemption. 13 I
mean to include these, too, in the category of "preemption interpretations."
Preemption interpretations may be explicit or implicit. Explicit preemption
interpretations may be mere interpretations with no other regulatory function, like those
contained in the regulations and amicus briefs in Riegel.14  Or, explicit preemption
interpretations may be predicates for substantive regulations that purport to preempt state
law themselves, like the preemption language in the preamble to the FDA's 2006 drug
6. Id. at 1000-01; 21 U.S.C. §§ 360(c)-360(n) (2006); id. at § 371(a) (2006).
7. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (2009).
8. Br. for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 3000 (2007) (mem.) (petition
stage brief); Br. for U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respt., Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999 (merits stage brief).
9. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1011.
10. See Merrill, supra n. 1, at 743.
I1. See generally Thomas 0. McGarity, The Preemption War: When Federal Bureaucracies Trump Local
Juries (Yale U. Press 2008). For examples, see Mendelson, supra n. 4, at 753; Nina A. Mendelson, A
Presumption against Agency Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 695, 699-704 (2008) [hereinafter Mendelson,
Presumption].
12. For examples of agency interpretations relating to whether state law is preempted as an "obstacle" to
federal statutory purposes, see e.g. Br. for U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petr. at 19, Wyeth v. Levine, 129
S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (arguing that FDA drug labeling decisions constitute a "floor" and a "ceiling" on warnings
for purposes of obstacle preemption under the FDCA); Br. of U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respts. at 25,
Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008) (denying any FTC policy approving the use of "Light" and
"Low Tar" descriptors in cigarette labeling for purposes of obstacle preemption under the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act).
13. E.g. Br. of U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respts., Altria, 129 S. Ct. 538; see also infra n. 154 and
accompanying text.
14. Infra nn. 51-63 and accompanying text.
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labeling regulations at issue in Wyeth v. Levine. 15 Where a regulation purports (or is
argued) to preempt state law, a preemption interpretation must be at least implicit: Since
the legitimacy of all agency action depends on the statutory delegation of authority to the
agency, arguably preemptive agency regulations necessarily depend on the agency's
interpretive conclusion that the statute permits preemption of the kind purportedly
effected by the regulation. 16  Where it is merely implicit, the agency's preemption
interpretation, to a court, is just something like "the agency thinks that the statute permits
regulations like this to preempt state law."
' 17
The extent to which courts should defer to agency preemption interpretations, I
argue, turns on whether agencies may legitimately issue preemption interpretations that
are binding-that supplant judicial preemption interpretations-in judicial
decisionmaking. So far, we have no clear answers.
Considered in the relevant doctrinal context, Riegel may be less anomalous than it
appears. The Supreme Court has not definitively resolved which of the established
deference rules-Chevron18 or Skidmore19-should apply to agency preemption
interpretations. Nor has it resolved the propriety of agency claims that substantive
regulatory actions may preempt state law on their own.2 1 This does not mean that courts
are not considering agency preemption interpretations. Catherine Sharkey suggests that
in preemption cases "the Court's reliance upon agency input has often been sub
silentio."22 Eskridge argues that the Court has most often applied a modified version of
Skidmore deference that takes account of persuasive agency interpretations but does not
necessarily constrain courts to adopt the agency's interpretation. 23  Highlighting the
absence of a clear rule, several scholars encourage courts to adopt more-or-less modified
versions of Skidmore deference when considering agency preemption interpretations.
24
15. 129 S. Ct. 1187. The FDA's preemption preamble is at 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3935-36 (Jan. 24, 2006).
Such a regulation was also considered in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007), discussed infra
notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
16. La. Pub. Serv. Commn. v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (holding that "an agency literally has no
power to act, let alone pre-empt [state law], unless and until Congress confers power upon it."); Mendelson,
Presumption, supra n. 11, at 705 (stating that "[o]n review, courts have sometimes framed the relevant question
as whether these [preemptive regulations] merit application of the Chevron doctrine. Implicit in this framing is
a judicial characterization of the agency's decision (sometimes matched by the agency's own express
characterization) as an authorized legal interpretation to which some form of judicial deference.., is due."
(footnote omitted)).
17. An agency attempt to claim preemptive authority without a supporting statutory interpretation would
raise serious concerns. See Young, supra n. 1, at 894-95. However, if an agency's claim to preemptive
authority truly does not depend on a statutory interpretation, it does not raise the kind of deference questions I
am concerned with here.
18. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
19. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
20. Stuart Minor Benjamin & Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net Down: Administrative Federalism
without Congress, 57 Duke L.J. 2111, 2132, 2132 n. 83 (2008); see Eskridge, supra n. 3, at 1473-74; Sharkey,
supra n. 2, at 471-77; Young, supra n. 1, at 883-85.
21. Cf Young, supra n. 1, at 870 (noting that "the Court has tended to say simply that '[flederal regulations
have no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes."') (quoting Fid. Fed. Say. & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta,
458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)).
22. Sharkey, supra n. 2, at 492.
23. Eskridge, supra n. 3, at 1473-74; Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern
Skidmore Standard, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1235, 1252-56 (2007).
24. E.g. Mendelson, supra n. 4, at 797-98; Merrill, supra n. 1, at 775-76; Sharkey, supra n. 2, at 497-98.
2009]
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Judicial oscillation on the question of deference to agency preemption
interpretations is perhaps to be expected, given the stakes. Federal preemption of state
law implicates important constitutional and regulatory interests. On one hand,
recognizing an authoritative role for agencies in interpreting the preemptive scope of
federal law would likely make for more preemption at the expense of federalism
values. 25 It would add to the preemption universe an additional category of actors-
federal agencies-with built-in institutional incentives to push for nationalizing
regulatory regimes. 26  On the other hand, allowing agencies with relatively greater
expertise than courts to determine whether state law is preempted may be the best way to
efficiently allocate regulatory authority among the national and state governments.
2 7
More abstractly, existing doctrine leaves open questions about the constitutional basis for
Congress's preemptive authority;2 8 agency involvement puts additional pressure on
preemption's underdefined normative basis by raising questions about whether
preemption authority can be exercised by, or delegated to, the executive branch.29
I want to resist suggesting that the courts adopt one or another of the deference
rules that have been proposed for agency preemption interpretations. While one might
read Riegel (and most other preemption cases where agencies offer preemption
interpretations) as implicitly adopting some deference rule, it is more plausibly read as
avoiding the deference question altogether. The opinion's language-"[n]either
accepting nor rejecting the proposition that"3° the FDA's interpretation "can properly be
consulted to determine the statute's meaning" 3 1-seems to affirmatively promote
ambiguity on that question under something like an avoidance rule. In this Article, I
suggest that courts can implement important constitutional norms by avoiding the
decision of whether agency interpretations regarding the preemptive scope of federal
statutes are entitled to any deference, under what I will call the "deference-avoidance
rule."
I argue that there are colorable constitutional doubts about the legitimacy of
constraining judicial interpretive authority on the question of whether federal law
preempts state law. And deference constitutes just such a constraint. Chevron deference
is based on the idea that Congress may shift authority to interpret ambiguous statutory
provisions from courts to agencies. It is thus a binding form of deference-where
Chevron's requirements are satisfied, courts must adopt the agency's interpretation.
32
Mendelson now advocates a presumption against even Skidmore deference to agency preemption decisions.
See generally Mendelson, Presumption, supra n. 11. Young proposes a preemption-specific form of Skidmore.
Young, supra n. 1, at 891-93.
25. Young, supra n. 1, at 869-70, 876-81.
26. Eskridge, supra n. 3, at 1455. Eskridge argues that agencies are likely to "press the statute toward
more, rather than less, government regulation." Id. Agencies are also likely to engage in "turf building." Id. at
1455 n. 56.
27. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron's Mistake, 58 Duke L.J. 549, 614-17 (2009); Sharkey, supra n. 2,
at 486.
28. See generally Pursley, supra n. 1.
29. See U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44; see also Thomas
W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L. J. 833, 853-56 (2001).
30. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1011.
31. Id.
32. See infra nn. 104-12 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 44:557
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But a plausible construction of the Supremacy Clause requires that courts primarily and
independently interpret federal law to determine whether there is a conflict with state law
sufficient to give rise to preemption. Avoiding determining the applicability of Chevron
deference thus allows the Court to avoid the difficult constitutional question of whether
judicial primacy on preemption can be shifted to agencies. In addition to Chevron, there
is the Skidmore deference rule, which is not based on congressional delegation of
interpretive authority, but rather flexibly calibrates deference according to the
persuasiveness of the agency's interpretation. Even though self-imposed by courts,
Skidmore also is viewed as a binding constraint on judicial interpretive authority where it
applies. 33  Avoiding determining Skidmore's applicability amounts to avoiding
constitutional doubts about whether courts may abdicate judicial primacy on preemption
on instrumental grounds. I thus defend the deference-avoidance rule as what Ernest
Young and others call a "normative" rule of statutory interpretation-a rule desirable and
defensible not because it leads to the most accurate statutory interpretations but because
it enforces constitutional norms.
34
Courts can avoid resolving the question of whether agency preemption
interpretations are entitled to deference in two ways, each corresponding to one of the
two established deference rules. First, they can avoid determining whether it is
constitutionally permissible to accord Chevron deference to an agency preemption
interpretation by construing ambiguous statutory grants of agency authority narrowly-
so as not to include the power to authoritatively interpret the preemptive scope of
statutes. Of course, if Congress enacted clear statutory language specifically delegating
to an agency the authority to issue preemption interpretations, a court would have to
resolve the constitutional doubts about Chevron deference to agency preemption
interpretations; after that, those doubts would no longer provide a reason for avoidance.
But so far, Congress has done no such thing. Second, courts can avoid determining
whether agency preemption interpretations are entitled to Skidmore deference by
reaching independent interpretive conclusions about the preemptive effect of the
statutory provisions that are the subject of the agency's preemption interpretation. The
upshot in both avoidance situations is that the court will independently interpret the
statute to determine whether it in fact effects the purported preemption.
Part II makes clear why I view Riegel as an instance of judicial avoidance of the
question of deference to agency preemption interpretations. I also discuss what I view as
Riegel's logical precursor, Watters v. Wachovia Bank.35 Part III discusses the broader
family of constitutional avoidance rules to which the deference-avoidance rule
belongs.36 I then discuss judicial deference doctrines in more detail to make clear how
the deference-avoidance rule would function on the ground. Part IV examines possible
justifications for the deference-avoidance rule, including justifications based on
33. See infra nn. 137-39 and accompanying text.
34. See Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial
Review, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1549, 1586-87 (2000); Bressman, supra n. 27, at 611-13; Daniel B. Rodriguez, The
Presumption of Reviewability: A Study in Canonical Construction and Its Consequences, 45 Vand. L. Rev.
743, 743-44 (1992).
35. 550 U.S. 1.
36. See generally Young, supra n. 34.
2009]
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constitutional federalism and non-delegation norms. I argue that the rule is best justified
as a way of enforcing a constitutional norm allocating to the judiciary the authority to
decide whether and to what extent federal law preempts state law. It does this by
allowing courts to avoid addressing constitutional doubts about whether agencies may
supplant courts in this interpretive task. A brief conclusion follows.
II. AVOIDANCE IN RIEGEL AND WA TTERS
In Riegel, the Court considered whether the FDA's full premarket approval process
for medical devices preempted state law tort claims against the manufacturer of an
arterial balloon catheter. 37  The Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to the federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, which give the FDA its premarket approval authority for
medical devices,3 8 expressly preempt state "'requirement[s].' relating to medical devices
that (1) are "'different from, or in addition to' any federal "'requirement
applicable.., to the device,"' and (2) .'relate[] to the safety or effectiveness of the
device or to any other matter included in a [federal] requirement applicable to the
device."' 39  This language required the Court to address two basic questions: First,
whether there was a federal "requirement" applicable to the catheter; and second,
whether the tort claims constituted state-law "requirements with respect to the device...
'different from, or in addition to' the federal ones, and relate[d] to safety and
effectiveness.4°
To answer the first question, the Court relied on its construction of the MDA in
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,4 1 to conclude that the full FDA premarket approval process
created preemptive federal "requirements.' '42  Lohr's interpretation of the MDA's
preemption provision, as the Riegel Court noted, was "substantially informed ' 43 by an
FDA regulation stating that only "specific [federal] requirements applicable to a
particular device ' A4 would preempt state law.4 5  Indeed, although Riegel omits
mentioning it, one reading of the majority opinion in Lohr is that the FDA's
interpretation of the MDA preemption provision was entitled to Chevron deference.
4 6
But Lohr is ambiguous: The majority did not explicitly say that it was deferring to the
agency's view under Chevron, even though it explained that the requirements for
Chevron deference-statutory ambiguity and a reasonable agency interpretation-were
47
satisfied. Instead, rather cryptically, the majority said its analysis of the statute was
37. 128 S. Ct. at 1006.
38. See supra n. 6.
39. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006); see Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1001 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)).
40. Id. at 1006 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)).
41. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
42. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1006-07.
43. Id. at 1007 (citing Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495).
44. Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (1995) and referring to Lohr, 518 U.S. at 498).
45. Id. (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (1995) as quoted in Lohr, 518 U.S. at 483).
46. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 496 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, and Hillsborough Co. v. Automated Med.
Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (1985)). In Hillsborough, the Court found the agency's understanding of the
preemptive effect of its regulations "dispositive." 471 U.S. at 714.
47. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 496. This ambiguity has not gone unnoticed. See Mass. Assn. of Health Maint. Orgs.
v. Ruthhardt, 194 F.3d 176, 182 (1st Cir. 1999); Sharkey, supra n. 2, at 493; Young, supra n. 1, at 885-86.
[Vol. 44:557
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merely "substantially informed" by the FDA's interpretation;48 and it said so in a section
of the opinion immediately following one in which a plurality concluded, after
examining the MDA's language and legislative history, that the statute itself made clear
that only device-specific "requirements" were covered by the preemption provision.
4 9
The peculiar phrasing and analytic process leave one to wonder exactly what weight the
Lohr Court gave to the FDA's interpretation and why. But the Riegel Court chose to
simply repeat the confusing "substantially informed" language from Lohr without
clarification-if anything, it muddied the waters even more by omitting all mention of
Chevron, or any other deference rule, in addressing the question.
50
In answering the second question-whether the challenged state tort laws were
preempted state "requirements" under the MDA-the Riegel Court took an even more
peculiar approach to weighting the FDA's views: It refused to decide how to weight
them.
In Lohr, the majority noted that "Congress has given the FDA a unique role in
determining the scope of § 360k's pre-emptive effect," 5 1 both by delegating general
authority to the FDA to implement the MDA and by "explicitly delegat[ing] to the FDA
the authority to exempt state regulations from the pre-emptive effect of the MDA" 52 in §
360k(b).53 Exercising this authority, the FDA, by regulation, exempted certain state
requirements from preemption, including "State or local requirements that are equal to,
or substantially identical to, requirements imposed by or under the [MDA] '' 54 and "State
or local requirements of general applicability where the purpose of the requirement
relates either to other products in addition to devices ... or to unfair trade practices in
which the requirements are not limited to devices.' '55 The Lohr Court relied on the
"substantially identical" regulatory language to hold that state tort claims were not
preempted if they amounted to claims that the manufacturer violated FDA
requirements 56
The Riegel petitioners argued that the regulatory exemption for "State or local
requirements of general applicability" precluded preemption of their claims, which were
predicated on state common law duties of "general applicability." 57 But rather than
accord the regulation the same deference-such as it was-that it received in Lohr, the
Court in Riegel expressly refused to decide whether "this regulation can properly be
consulted to determine the statute's meaning." 58 Instead, the Court held that the statute
alone made clear that the state tort claims were preempted, explaining that:
The MDA provides that no State 'may establish or continue in effect with respect to a
48. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495-96.
49. Id. at486-91.
50. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1006-07.
51. 518 U.S. at 495-96.
52. Id. at 496.
53. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(b); id. at § 371(a); Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495-96.
54. 21 C.F.R. at § 808.1(d)(2).
55. Id. at § 808.1(d)(1).
56. 518 U.S. at 495.
57. Br. for Petr. at 33-34, 36, Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999; Reply Br. for Petr. at 8, Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999.
58. 128S. Ct. at 1011.
20091
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device.., any requirement' relating to safety or effectiveness that is different from, or in
addition to, federal requirements. The Riegels' suit depends upon New York's
'continu[ing] in effect' general tort duties 'with respect to' Medtronic's catheter. Nothing
in the statutory text suggests that the pre-empted state requirement must apply only to the
relevant device, or only to medical devices and not to all products and all actions in
general.
59
The Court's explanation for not deciding the deference question was convoluted.
In addressing the FDA's call for deference to its broad MDA preemption position offered
in the government's amicus brief,60 the Court explained that even if it were inclined to
consider deferring to the FDA's views-which it was not-those views were unreliable
because the FDA had recently changed its position on the meaning of its own regulatory
interpretation of the MDA's preemptive scope. 6 1 Contrary to its briefing position in
Riegel, the FDA in earlier amicus briefs had cited its regulations to advocate narrower
constructions of the MDA preemption provision. 62  In addressing the petitioners'
suggestion that it defer to the FDA's earlier preemption-related regulations and simply
disregard the FDA's contradictory briefing positions, the Court explained-again in the
form of a hypothetical conditional-that even if the regulations were entitled to some
deference, they did not unambiguously support a decision for or against preemption.
63
The Court thus refused to decide among the competing proffered deference approaches.
Nevertheless, it effected the FDA's desired result; the state tort claims were preempted.
The Court's avoidance move in Riegel was of a piece with its explicit avoidance
approach in Watters v. Wachovia Bank.64  There, the issue was whether the National
Bank Act (NBA), 65 or a regulation promulgated thereunder by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), preempted Michigan state mortgage lending
regulations. 66 The NBA provides that "'[n]o national bank shall be subject to any
visitorial powers except as authorized by federal law. ... -67 The Court had previously
construed this provision to preempt state laws that "prevent or significantly interfere with
the national bank's or the national bank regulator's exercise of its powers." 68  OCC
59. Id. at 1010 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
60. Br. for U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respt. at 23-24, Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999.
61. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1009 (discussing FDA's change of position and ultimately concluding that "[wie
have found it unnecessary to rely upon that agency view because we think the statute itself speaks clearly to the
point at issue.").
62. E.g. Br. of U.S. as Amicus Curiae at 12, Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Leg. Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001);
Br. of U.S. as Amicus Curiae, Lohr, 518 U.S. 470.
63. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1009; Br. for Petr. at 33-34, Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999. The Court's approach was
similar in Altria, 129 S. Ct. at 549-50, involving preemption under the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (2006). The cigarette manufacturer argued, for one thing, that state-
law claims that labeling cigarettes "Light" or "Low Tar" constituted consumer fraud were preempted by the
FTC's alleged policy of allowing cigarette manufacturers to use "Light" and "Low Tar" in their labeling. As it
did in Riegel, the Court in Altria used the hypothetical-conditional formulation to avoid any question of
deference, stating that "[e]ven if such a regulatory policy could provide the basis for obstacle pre-emption,
petitioners' description of the FTC's actions in this regard are inaccurate." 129 S. Ct. at 549.
64. 550U.S. 1.
65. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1-14(2006).
66. 550 U.S. at 4.
67. Watters, 550 U.S. at II (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2006)). "Visitorial" authority includes
supervisory and inspection powers. Id. at 14-15 (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(a)(2) (2006)).
68. Id. at 12 (citing Barnett Bank of Marion Co., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 32-34 (1996); Franklin Natl.
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administers the NBA, including the sections governing mortgage lending. 69 Michigan
tried to enforce its mortgage laws-including a provision vesting "general supervision
and control" over state-registered lenders in Michigan's Office of Insurance and
Financial Services-against a Wachovia subsidiary. 70  Thus the preemption question
was whether NBA provisions relating to national bank mortgage lending also applied to
subsidiaries. If they did, then Michigan's attempts to regulate Wachovia's subsidiary
would be preempted for interfering with Wachovia's and OCC's powers under the
NBA.
71
The Court's framing of the question is significant. In 2001, OCC provided by
regulation that "State laws apply to national bank operating subsidiaries to the same
extent that those laws apply to the parent national bank.",72 The Sixth Circuit held that
OCC's regulation preempted the Michigan laws regardless of "whether Congress has
expressly and clearly manifested its intent to preempt" in the NBA.73  The court
concluded that OCC's regulations drew Chevron deference; thus, Michigan's concession
that its laws conflicted with OCC regulations meant that "the only question is whether
the Comptroller 'has exceeded [its] statutory authority or acted arbitrarily. ' 74 Finding
OCC's regulation reasonable, the court of appeals held the Michigan provisions
preempted. 75  Despite the clear basis for the Sixth Circuit's decision, and despite
invitations by both Wachovia and the OCC to defer to the OCC regulation, the Supreme
Court expressly avoided the deference question and affirmed the result on purely
statutory grounds. 76 The Court explained:
[U]nder our interpretation of the statute, the level of deference owed to the regulation is an
academic question. [The regulation] merely clarifies and confirms what the NBA already
conveys: A national bank has the power to engage in real estate lending through an
operating subsidiary, subject to the same terms and conditions that govern the national
bank itself; that power cannot be significantly impaired or impeded by state law.
77
Watters thus prefigured the Court's avoidance move in Riegel.78 The Court's two
most recent preemption decisions, Altria Group, Inc. v. Good and Wyeth v. Levine,
Bank of Franklin Square v. N. Y., 347 U.S. 373, 377-79 (1954)).
69. Id.; 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 93a, 371(a) (2006).
70. Watters, 550 U.S. at 8 (citing Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 445.1661, 445.1665, 445.1666, 493.58,
493.56b, 493.59, 493.62a (West 2002)).
71. Id. at 14-15.
72. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 (2009).
73. Wachovia Bank v. Watters, 431 F.3d 556, 560 (6th Cir. 2005).
74. See id. at 560 (quoting De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 154).
75. Id. at 562-63.
76. Watters, 550 U.S. at 20-21. See Br. for the Respts. at 35-44, Watters, 550 U.S. 1; Br. for the U.S. as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respts. at 9-22, Watters, 550 U.S. 1.
77. Watters, 550U.S. at20-21.
78. Cf Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 Duke L.J. 2023, 2046 (2008)
(noting that "Riegel is in many ways a Watters redux, with the Court again eschewing the need to determine
what level of deference to accord an administrative preemption determination .... "). While I think that Riegel
and Waiters may signal the adoption of a particular constitutional avoidance principle, Metzger thinks that
"Riegel reinforces the impression that the Court is not approaching these cases with an eye" to constitutional
concerns; instead it is "focused on the details of the specific statutory and regulatory schemes at issue." Id. at
2047.
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similarly avoided the question of deference to agency preemption interpretations. 79 And
it could be that the Court's non-committal treatment of deference in Lohr constituted
avoidance. Avoidance may explain Eskridge's observation that the Court often does
not make clear which, if any, deference standard it is using. 8 1 It is also consistent with
Eskridge's further observation that the Court decides preemption issues consistently with
the agency's preemption interpretation most of the time-after all, as Watters and Riegel
demonstrate, the Court may on statutory grounds reach the same conclusions as the
agency.82 But my claim is primarily normative. Justifying a deference-avoidance rule in
preemption cases requires more than showing a rough correspondence to the Supreme
Court's approach. To start making the justificatory case, I need to give some general
theoretical background on avoidance rules.
III. THE CONDITIONS FOR AVOIDANCE: STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL DOUBTS
We can generalize the deference-avoidance rule as follows: Courts should avoid
deciding whether to accord deference to agency interpretations of the preemptive scope
of federal statutes. In this Part, I give some theoretical background on both judicial
avoidance rules and deference doctrines. This should make for a better description of the
deference-avoidance rule.
A. Kinds ofAvoidance Rules
We can divide constitutional avoidance rules into "procedural" and "interpretive"
avoidance. 83 Procedural avoidance cautions that federal courts should decide cases on
non-constitutional grounds whenever they are available. 84 Here, avoidance orders issues
for decision-courts address non-constitutional issues first to try to resolve cases without
79. For a discussion of Altria, see supra note 63 and accompanying text. For a description of the issue in
Levine, see supra note 12 and accompanying text. Addressing the question of whether the FDA's preemption
interpretation was entitled to deference, the Levine Court noted that "we have given 'some weight' to an
agency's views about the impact of tort law on federal objectives when 'the subject matter is technica[l] and
the relevant history and background are complex and extensive."' 129 S. Ct. at 1201 (quoting Geier v. Am.
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000)). "[H]owever, we have not deferred to an agency's conclusion
that state law is pre-empted." Id. (emphasis in original). The Court then said that the "weight we accord the
agency's explanation of state law's impact on the federal scheme depends on its thoroughness, consistency, and
persuasiveness," seemingly referring to the Skidmore standard, but held that "the FDA's 2006 preamble does
not merit deference" because it was inconsistent with what the Court determined was the clear congressional
intent regarding preemption under the FDCA. Id. at 1201-05. This, like Lohr, is ambiguous. The Court did
not make clear which deference standard it was rejecting, whether deference would have been binding had it
applied, or whether deference could ever be required for agency "conclusions" about preemption-what I have
labeled agency "preemption interpretations." And, as the dissent points out, the majority's conclusion about
congressional intent was not as clear as the majority would have it. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1217-20 (Alito, J.,
Roberts, C.J. & Scalia, J., dissenting).
80. See supra nn. 41-49 and accompanying text.
81. Eskridge, supra n. 3, at 1473-74.
82. Id. at 1478 (noting that the Court's decisions were consistent with agencies' desired results 84.6 percent
of the time when the agency opposed preemption, and 64.4 percent of the time when the agency favored
preemption).
83. See Young, supra n. 34, at 1574-76. "Procedural avoidance" is Adrian Vermeule's coinage. See
Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 Geo. L.J. 1945, 1948 (1997).
84. Young, supra n. 34, at 1575; see also Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C.
L. Rev. 1003, 1025 (1994) (calling this the "last resort rule"); see e.g. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297
U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (identifying seven components of the avoidance doctrine).
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having to address constitutional doubts. They are only doubts because the constitutional
issues are never actually decided. But procedural avoidance does not tug one way or the
other in the disposition of particular issues on the merits. 85 Interpretive avoidance, by
contrast, is a rule of statutory construction that determines a merits question by selecting
from among competing possible interpretations one that avoids raising doubts about the
statute's constitutionality. 86 It "cover[s] those cases in which the statute at issue might
be unconstitutional ' 87 and therefore does not require that the court actually decide the
constitutionality of the statute under the dubious interpretation. 88  In other words,
interpretive avoidance, too, is justified by constitutional "doubt."
Interpretive avoidance also requires that there be at least two reasonable
interpretations of the statute-a constitutionally doubtful one and a safer alternative.
89
Identifying the statutory uncertainty is important because it brackets the cases in which
interpretive avoidance has "bite." 90 Interpretive avoidance only does work if the most
plausible reading is the constitutionally doubtful one. Under those circumstances, an
avoidance rule directs the court to select the less plausible reading to avoid constitutional
doubt. If the more plausible reading is also the constitutionally unproblematic one, then
avoidance only directs the court to choose the interpretation it would have selected
anyway as a matter of good statutory construction. 9 1 As Justice Scalia put it, "'[a]dopt
the interpretation that avoids constitutional doubt if that is the right one' produces
precisely the same result as 'adopt the right interpretation.'
92
Given that avoidance can take these different forms, characterizing the deference-
avoidance rule requires further exploration of the deference questions being avoided.
B. Kinds of Deference Questions
Most any agency action potentially has preemptive effect. The prevailing judicial
view is that valid ordinary federal regulations preempt conflicting state laws.93 And
courts accept that a federal agency's interpretation of a federal statute's substantive
provisions indirectly may determine whether state laws are preempted when courts apply
ordinary statutory preemption rules to the statute as construed by the agency. 94 The
Court has no trouble straightforwardly addressing deference for an agency's
interpretation of "the substantive (as opposed to pre-emptive) meaning of a statute" 9 5;
but it has distinguished agency interpretations of "whether a statute is pre-emptive" 96 -
85. Young, supra n. 34, at 1575; Verneule, supra n. 83, at 1948.
86. Young, supra n. 34, at 1575; see e.g. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62, 62 n. 30 (1932).
87. Young, supra n. 34, at 1576 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 1576 (emphasis added); see id. at 1578-79.
89. Id. at 1576.
90. Id. at 1577-78.
91. Id. at 1577.
92. Almendarez-Torres v. U.S., 523 U.S. 224, 270 (Scalia, Stevens, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
93. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153-54; U.S. v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 381 (1961). For doubts, see Young,
supra n. 1, at 894-900.
94. See Young, supra n. 1, at 884-85.
95. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 744 (1996) (emphasis in original).
96. Id. (emphasis in original).
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what I have labeled agency "preemption interpretations"-as more problematic.
97
The focus on the difficulty of the specific question of deference for agency
preemption interpretations is telling. One might think that the Court's approach in cases
like Riegel, Watters, Altria, and Levine just reflects a general concern with the difficulty
of figuring out the applicability of deference doctrines to the particular agency
interpretations at issue in those cases. Courts may, and likely often do, avoid deciding
issues that are for some reason particularly difficult. Where alternative grounds for
decision are available, this is a way to avoid errors. But there is no real reason to think
that the agency interpretations at issue in those cases, in and of themselves, presented
particularly difficult problems for the applicability of established deference rules. And
there is no indication that the Court was acting on this more general sort of concern. It
did not grapple with the Chevron or Skidmore factors in evaluating the agency
interpretations; instead, it focused on the fact that the interpretations were agency
conclusions about preemption as the source of worry. So it seems fair to say that
avoidance in these cases was motivated not by problems with deference in general but
rather by problems with deference to agency preemption interpretations in particular.
The deference-avoidance rule appears to be based on something about the nature of
agency preemption interpretations.
Preemption cases almost always involve ambiguity about a statute's preemptive
scope. 98  Indeed, the question of deference can only arise where there is such
ambiguity-if the preemptive scope of the statute is clear, there is no interpretive work to
be done and thus no question of deference to agency interpretations. 99 Despite their
rhetoric of "clear" statutory meaning, neither Riegel nor Watters involved unambiguous
preemption provisions. The dissents in both cases advanced plausible but contrary
interpretations of the relevant statutory language. 10 0 The Watters dissent highlights the
way the majority strained to rest its conclusion on statutory grounds, noting that "none of
the four Circuits to have addressed this issue relied on the preemptive force of the NBA
itself' but instead "asked whether the OCC's regulations preempted state laws."
10 1
Professor Young reminds us that "statutory clarity is emphatically a question of degree"
and "the importance of any given canon or rule of construction will be... a function of
the willingness of courts to find that statutes are 'unclear."'' 10 2 In cases like Riegel and
97. Id. at 739-40; Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1201 (distinguishing agency views about "the impact of tort law on
federal objectives," which may draw deference, from "an agency's conclusion that state law is preempted.")
(emphasis in original).
98. See generally Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. Rev. 967
(2002).
99. Hickman & Krueger, supra n. 23, at 1246-47, 1264-66.
100. Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1013-20 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Watters, 550 U.S. at 22-44 (Stevens, J.,
Roberts, C.J. & Scalia, J., dissenting). In Levine, too, the dissent took issue with what the majority
characterized as "clear" congressional intent regarding preemption under the FDCA. 129 S. Ct. at 1189-91
(Alito, J., Roberts, C.J. & Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that "Congress made its 'purpose' plain in authorizing
the FDA-not state tort juries-to determine when and under what circumstances a drug is 'safe."').
101. Watters, 550 U.S. at 32 (Stevens, J., Roberts, C.J. & Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Wachovia Bank N.A.
v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 315-16 (2d Cir. 2005); Natl. City Bank of Ind v. Turnbaugh, 463 F.3d 325, 331-33
(4th Cir. 2006); Wachovia Bank v. Watters, 431 F.3d 556, 560-63; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Boutris, 419 F.3d
949, 962-67 (9th Cir. 2005)).
102. Young, supra n. 34, at 1577.
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Watters where the finding of statutory "clarity" is at least a stretch, I would add that the
visibility of deference or avoidance rules will be a function of the willingness of courts to
admit that statutes are unclear. As John Manning and others have pointed out, judicial
findings of statutory clarity often mask silent applications of normative rules of
interpretation.' 0 3 The ambiguity of the preemption provisions and the fact that deference
would have generated the same outcome the Court strained to reach on statutory
grounds, I think, show that Riegel and Watters are better described as incorporating a
deference-avoidance rule than as resting on "clear" statutory text.
The deference-avoidance rule may, but never necessarily will, alter the result in a
case. After all, a court can always adopt, on statutory grounds, the interpretation
proposed by the agency (if that option is not available, then it is unlikely that the agency
interpretation would draw deference anyway). Deference-avoidance rejects only the
invitation to decide whether the agency preemption interpretation is entitled to deference
in the court's decisionmaking process. As long as the Court bases its decision on the
statute rather than on deference to agency input, constitutional doubts raised by deferring
to the agency's preemption interpretations do not favor one interpretation of the statute's
preemptive scope over another.
To get a firmer grip on the deference-avoidance rule, we need to consider the
deference rules in detail. The two established deference rules that might apply to agency
preemption interpretations are Chevron and Skidmore. The difference relevant here is
that Chevron involves a statutory question about the nature of the agency's delegated
authority while Skidmore is a pragmatic standard that does not require analysis of the
statutory delegation.
1. Chevron Deference and Statutory Doubts
The Chevron doctrine is based on the idea that Congress may by statute bind courts
to accept reasonable agency statutory interpretations by delegating lawmaking authority
to the agency. 10 4 Where there is ambiguity as to whether the statute in fact binds the
court to accept the agency's interpretation of the statute's preemptive scope and
deference would raise constitutional doubts, the court might interpret the statute not to
require deference. This would be a species of interpretive avoidance.
Chevron deference requires a court to adopt an agency's interpretation of an
ambiguous portion of the statute it is charged with administering so long as the agency's
view is reasonable. 10 5 Chevron applies only to agency interpretations set forth under
"circumstances reasonably suggesting that Congress" intended the particular form of
interpretation to receive deference. 10 6  Where Chevron applies, the agency's
103. John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 S. Ct. Rev. 223, 231-37
(describing the Court's construction of the FDCA in FDA. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 529 U.S. 120
(2000), as an application of an avoidance canon disguised as a finding of "clear" legislative intent); cf
Mendelson, supra n. 4, at 745-47 (criticizing the idea of using normative canons in Chevron's "Step ").
104. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2071,2093 (1990).
105. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
106. Mead, 533 U.S. at 230-31. Mead extended Chevron to agency interpretations in any form "deserving"
of deference-typically any form in which Congress empowered the agency to act with "the force of law." Id.
at 226-27; Christensen v. Harris Co., 529 U.S. 576, 586-87 (2000).
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interpretation "is binding in the courts." 10 7 A reasonable agency interpretation must be
adopted "even if it is not the interpretation that the court finds most plausible."
10 8
Chevron is generally justified on the ground that Congress impliedly delegated the power
to issue authoritative interpretations of the statute to the agency. 109 Understood this
way, Chevron implements a separation-of-powers principle: Since Congress
unquestionably has the power to say what its legislation means, it follows that, ceteris
paribus, Congress may delegate the power to resolve statutory ambiguities to agencies
rather than courts.1 10 A consensus of commentators, doctrine, history, and practicality
all indicate that such delegations do not impermissibly intrude on the judiciary's
authority to "say what the law is." I II Indeed, failure to defer to an agency's
interpretation in the face of such a delegation might amount to judicial usurpation of
legislative power. 112
In United States v. Mead Corp.,113 the Court held that Chevron deference applies
only when an agency acts pursuant to its particular delegated authority to take actions
"with the force of law." 114 This focuses the Chevron inquiry on congressional intent
regarding the content of the agency's delegated authority. 115 The presumption under
Chevron is that ambiguous statutory language alone signals congressional intent to
delegate interpretive authority to the agency regarding the subject of the ambiguous
language. Recognizing that mere statutory ambiguity is a crude proxy for congressional
intent, Mead refines the analysis by signaling courts to look for additional indicia of
congressional intent to delegate. Statutory provision of procedures by which the agency
may act "with the force of law" is one such additional proxy for congressional intent. In
preemption cases, the Mead question is whether Congress intended the delegation to
include authority to act "with the force of law" regarding preemption. 116  Since the
deference issue will be about an agency preemption interpretation, the real question is
whether Congress intended to give the agency the power to authoritatively construe the
statute's preemptive scope. And competing interpretations of the statutory delegation
most often will be available. While administrative statutes almost always have some
107. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227 (emphasis added).
108. Merrill & Hickman, supra n. 29, at 859.
109. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844; Hickman & Krueger, supra n. 23, at 1242; Mendelson, supra n. 4, at 743;
Merrill & Hickman, supra n. 29, at 870-72;Young, supra n. 1, at 892.
110. Particular constitutional restrictions may invalidate particular delegations, as I discuss below in Part IV.
See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 26 (1983).
111. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); see James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, "Some
Effectual Power ": The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 Colum. L.
Rev. 696, 878-79 (1998); Monaghan, supra n. 110, at 26-27.
112. See Monaghan, supra n. 110, at 28; cf Merrill & Hickman, supra n. 29, at 864-72 (arguing that
Chevron is best theorized as based on judicial deference to congressional intent).
113. 533U.S.218.
114. Id.at229.
115. Id. at 228-31; Hickman & Krueger, supra n. 23, at 1246 (arguing that, under Mead, "reviewing courts
must consider all circumstances surrounding the statutory scheme and agency action to ascertain whether
'Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law' on the matter at hand").
116. City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 64 (1988) (holding that "in a situation where state law is claimed
to be pre-empted by federal regulation ... the correct focus is on ... the proper bounds of [the agency's] lawful
authority to undertake such action"); Young, supra n. 1, at 896 (noting that "[a]gency action will thus be held
to preempt state law if(1) the agency intended it to do so, and (2) the agency's preemptive action is within the
scope of its delegated authority").
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language delegating general implementing authority to an agency, Nina Mendelson has
shown that Congress only rarely delegates specific authority over preemption issues.
117
This leaves general delegations ambiguous-they may be read to either include or
exclude authority over preemption. 118  There is a persuasive case for thinking that
Congress typically intends broad delegations to include preemption authority-that is,
authority to issue binding constructions of the statute's preemptive scope.
First, as Roderick Hills argues, pro-preemption interest groups are (1) more
regularly engaged with legislation than anti-preemption groups, and (2) likely to act in a
way that actually reduces the public visibility of Congress's deliberations about
preemption.1 19  Since pro-preemption interests may be satisfied with statutory
ambiguity, the absence of express preemption language or other readily identifiable
expressions of intent does not necessarily rule out congressional intent to preempt.
120
Second, the obstacles to legislation "vetogates," and congressional strategies for
overcoming them (bundling legislation into omnibus bills, for example), make it more
likely that congressional delegations will be vague and that congressional intent
regarding the scope of delegations will be ambiguous. 12 1 But Congress's motivation to
enact lasting statutes, the difficulty of amending enacted statutes ex post, and pressure
from similarly influential but opposing interest groups make delegation an attractive
strategy and, consequently, make broad delegation more likely. 12 2  Thus, Eskridge
117. See Mendelson, supra n. 4, at 789-91, 790 n. 219; Mendelson, Presumption, supra n. 11, at 721, 721 n.
143 (giving examples).
118. For normative debates about whether to construe delegations broadly or narrowly, see e.g. Benjamin &
Young, supra n. 20, at 2152-54 (emphasizing rules reinforcing Congress's role in defining agency powers);
Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law's Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at
the Edge of Federal Power, 57 Duke L.J. 1933, 2008-10 (2008) (express delegation of preemption authority is
unnecessary); Manning, supra n. 103, at 252 (advocating narrow construction as a "means of avoiding serious
nondelegation questions"); Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to
Exclusive Delegation, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 2097, 2141-51 (2004) (similar to Benjamin & Young, supra n. 20);
Metzger, supra n. 78 (suggesting that delegation is unproblematic because ordinary administrative law
principles can effectively promote constitutional federalism values); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons,
67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 315, 317-18 (2000) (similar to Benjamin & Young, supra n. 20) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Nondelegation Canons]; Sunstein, supra n. 104, at 2111-14 (similar to Benjamin & Young, supra n. 20).
There are also specific debates about whether it is normatively desirable to read such delegations to include
preemption authority. Compare e.g. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra n. 118, at 2006-17 with Young, supra n. 1, at
886-87, 894-900.
119. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative
Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1,29-31, 34-35 (2007); see also Mendelson, Presumption, supra n. 11, at 709-10.
120. The conflict between pro and anti-preemption interests may result in a legislative compromise that
omits, rather than includes, statutory preemption language, especially where the interests are fairly evenly
influential. This fits with Baker and Krawiec's view that Congress tends to shirk political responsibility for
policy choices whenever "two or more powerful interest groups are at odds over particular statutory language.
In such instances, Congress may seek to employ statutory incompleteness to avoidfully alienating any interest
group, while still retaining the freedom to argue to voters that they have enacted a statute that is prolabor,
proenvironment, or conforms to some other ideology that has broad electoral support." Scott Baker &
Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Penalty Default Canon, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 663, 674 (2004). See generally
Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glen 0. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 Cornell L.
Rev. 1 (1982).
121. See Bressman, supra n. 27, at 566-75; Eskridge,supra n. 3, at 1451-53.
122. See Bressman, supra n. 27, at 566-75; Eskridge, supra n. 3, at 1457; see also David Epstein & Sharyn
O'Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate
Powers 237-38 (Cambridge U. Press 1999) (arguing that delegations are used to counteract interest group
influence); Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra n. 118, at 324-25. As Merrill observes, empirical questions
about the circumstances that lead Congress to delegate rather than legislate remain unsettled. Merrill, supra n.
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claims that delegation of authority over preemption is probably anticipated and even
intended where statutes "contain ambitious regulatory initiatives.., together with
massive delegation of responsibilities to agencies ... ." 123 Third, as Sunstein and
Bressman have pointed out, statutory ambiguity always amounts to a delegation of
interpretive authority to either agencies or courts. 1 24 Courts are known to be inferior to
agencies in general policy-related decisionmaking; and, though it is disputed, agencies
may have an institutional edge on preemption as well. 125 Thus, when ambiguity is the
best Congress could do, there are reasons to think that general delegations are meant to
confer preemption authority on agencies. 126 Or, at the very least, there appears to be no
decisive reason to presume that Congress meant to leave preemption to the courts rather
than an agency.
Since it is plausible that general delegations of implementing authority often are
meant to include preemption in the agency's portfolio, a rule avoiding Chevron likely
will "bite" in many cases by selecting the less descriptively likely interpretation that the
delegation does not include preemption authority. In Levine, for example, the Court
construed the FDA's broad implementing authority under the FDCA not to include
preemption authority-in part because the statute contains neither the express
preemption language nor the kind of explicit delegation of FDA authority over some
preemption issues that the MDA contains-and thus avoided even mentioning
Chevron.127 The bite is more straightforward where the statute has express preemptive
language. As Mendelson observes, it is rare to get a clearer statement of congressional
intent to delegate preemption authority to an agency than a general delegation of
implementing authority along with express statutory preemption language. 128 Both the
MDA and the NBA contained such language, yet the Court in both Riegel and Watters
avoided the Chevron question. 129 If interpreting such statutes to delegate preemption
118, at 2142. 1 just suggest that the evidence paints a complex picture and points in the direction of at least
many very broad delegations including preemption authority even when preemption is not addressed in the
statutory text.
123. Eskridge, supra n. 3, at 1460.
124. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra n. 118, at 329-30.
125. See Bressman, supra n. 27, at 568-69. On courts' general policy-making deficiencies, see Chevron,
467 U.S. at 844, 865; Mendelson, supra n. 4, at 744. For the view that agencies have greater capacity than
courts for preemption decisionmaking, see Merrill, supra n. 1, at 755-58; Sharkey, supra n. 2, at 485-90. For
doubts about administrative competence on preemption, see Eskridge, supra n. 3, at 1455, 1455 n. 56, 1457;
Mendelson, Presumption, supra n. 11, at 698.
126. At times, the Court appears to have embraced this view. See La. Pub. Serv. Commn. v. FCC, 476 U.S.
at 369 (agencies are empowered to preempt when "acting within the scope of [their] congressionally delegated
authority"); see also Howard P. Walthall, Jr., Student Author, Chevron v. Federalism: A Reassessment of
Deference to Administrative Preemption, 28 Cumb. L. Rev. 715, 732 (arguing that courts think general
delegations include preemption authority); but see Mendelson, supra n. 4 (arguing judicial treatment has been
unclear).
127. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1204-06. But the delegation question was not entirely unambiguous since the
dissenters thought "Congress made its 'purpose' plain in authorizing the FDA-not state tort juries-to
determine when and under what circumstances a drug is 'safe."' Id. at 1189-91 (Alito, J., Roberts, C.J. &
Scalia, J., dissenting).
128. Mendelson, Presumption, supra n. 11, at 698, 706-07.
129. The MDA contains express preemption language, 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a), general delegation language, id.
at § 371(a), and an express delegation to the FDA of some preemption authority, id. at § 360k. See Riegel, 128
S. Ct. at 1000-01. The NBA contains express preemption language, 12 U.S.C. § 484(a), and general delegation
language, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 93a, 371(a). See Watters, 550 U.S. at 6-8.
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authority to agencies would raise constitutional doubts-as I argue below-then
avoiding a construction of the statutory delegation that could give rise to Chevron
deference by adopting a narrower construction of the delegation is fairly characterized as
interpretive avoidance. 13 0 The delegation thus narrowly construed, the court would need
to make an independent determination about the statute's preemptive scope.
But Riegel and Watters also avoided Skidmore deference, which does not
necessarily depend on a construction of the statutory delegation of authority to the
agency.
2. Skidmore Deference and Judicial Interpretive Discretion
The Skidmore standard provides for deference calibrated to the agency
interpretation's "power to persuade."' 13 1  Persuasiveness is measured by qualitative
factors, including the interpretation's thoroughness, formality, validity, consistency over
time, longevity, and contemporaneity with enactment of the statute, as well as the
agency's expertise in the area. 132 Skidmore differs from Chevron because it applies to
agency interpretations that are "not controlling upon the courts by reason of their
authority .... 133 In other words, Skidmore deference is not predicated on a finding that
Congress delegated interpretive authority to an agency rather than to the courts.
13 4
While both constrain judicial interpretive discretion, Skidmore's normative justification
differs from Chevron's. It is justified not by constitutional separation-of-powers norms
but primarily by the instrumental norm favoring the interpretation made by the institution
best situated to interpret correctly. 135 Underlying the norm is a basic value-we want to
get the law as right as we can as often as we can. The default rule is that courts should
interpret ambiguous statutes because courts have general expertise in statutory
interpretation. Skidmore creates an exception by identifying instances where, even if
Congress has not allocated interpretive authority to them, agencies are nevertheless the
best situated interpreter-where proper interpretation requires expertise that an agency
has and courts lack-and requiring judicial deference to harness agencies' institutional
advantages. Skidmore promotes the basic value, and is thus justified, because it
precludes judicial interpretation where it is likely to be second-best.
One might think that avoiding deciding whether to apply Skidmore deference is the
functional equivalent of applying or rejecting Skidmore deference sub silentio. After all,
on one view of Skidmore, the "persuasiveness" of the agency's interpretation may be
determined simply by the extent to which it coincides with the court's own interpretation
of the statute. 136 On this view, avoidance and application of Skidmore cash out to the
130. This is familiar--courts employ a variety of normative canons that require construing delegations
narrowly despite Chevron. See generally Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra n. 118.
131. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140).
132. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; Hickman & Krueger, supra n. 23, at 1258-59.
133. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. There is confusion about Skidmore's applicability. See infra n. 141.
134. See Bressman, supra n. 27, at 607.
135. See Hickman & Krueger, supra n. 23, at 1249; Young, supra n. 1, at 892.
136. Some think that courts cite Skidmore as cover for independent interpretation. See Hickman & Krueger,
supra n. 23, at 1252-55 (discussing "the independent judgment model of Skidmore review" and citing Colin S.
Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549, 564 (1985); Richard W.
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same thing where the court's interpretation has the same result with respect to
preemption as the agency's interpretation would have had, if adopted; avoidance and
rejection of Skidmore cash out to the same thing where the court reaches a different
result with respect to preemption than would have obtained if the agency's interpretation
had been adopted.
But most, including the majority of courts, view Skidmore as a binding constraint
on judicial interpretive discretion: Where the qualitative factors make Skidmore
applicable, a court must give special and often decisive weight to the agency's
interpretation even if it differs from the interpretation the court thinks is best.137 This
makes sense of the idea that Skidmore is deference.-"deference, to be meaningful," must
require that the court's preferred interpretation be supplanted by the agency's where the
deference applies. 138 For this to make sense in the Skidmore context, it must be that the
"persuasiveness" of an agency interpretation is not determined solely by its
correspondence to the court's interpretation. This is signaled by the Skidmore test: The
validity of the agency's interpretation is but one criterion for deference, and it seems that
"validity" requires only that the agency's interpretation be a plausible one, not that it
correspond with the court's idea of the "correct" interpretation. 139  The court's and
agency's interpretations may be the same, but they need not be; an agency's
interpretation may be persuasive enough to qualify for Skidmore deference even if the
court would reach a different result interpreting the statute independently. So, too, an
agency's interpretation may fail to qualify for Skidmore deference even if the court
would reach the same conclusion interpreting independently.
The question of Skidmore's applicability is thus substantively distinct from the
question of the proper interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions. When a court
avoids deciding Skidmore's applicability, it avoids evaluating the "persuasiveness" of the
agency's preemption interpretation. Now, in a sense, this is like rejecting Skidmore
deference in the particular case. But, unlike a prospective doctrinal rule that Skidmore
deference is inapplicable to agency preemption interpretations, the avoidance approach
leaves open the possibility that Skidmore might be applied to a preemption interpretation
in a future case. While it is harder to see how the Skidmore question could be placed
squarely before a court in the way that a clear delegation of specific agency authority to
issue binding preemption interpretations might force courts to confront the Chevron
question, it seems possible. For example, if a court is simply unable, for whatever
reason, to reach its own independent conclusion about the preemptive effect of a statute,
it might be forced to decide whether it can permissibly defer to an agency preemption
interpretation under Skidmore. More plausibly, it seems like the parties to a case could
force the issue by framing an appeal or certiorari petition to present only the question of
Murphy, Judicial Deference, Agency Commitment, and Force of Law, 66 Ohio St. L.J. 1013, 1015 (2005)).
137. See id. at 55-59. Hickman and Krueger's empirical study of judicial treatment of Skidmore deference
led them to conclude that "Skidmore deference, while less deferential than Chevron, is nevertheless highly
deferential to administrative interpretations as applied." Id. at 1271. Cf Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1201 (evaluating
the possibility of giving "some weight" to agency interpretations, and citing Skidmore, but not specifying how
much deference would be appropriate).
138. Monaghan, supra n. 110, at 5.
139. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; Hickman & Krueger, supra n. 23, at 1258-59.
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whether Skidmore deference to agency preemption interpretations is permissible. And
Congress could draft a statute in a manner that presents the Skidmore issue directly-
e.g., by including a provision instructing courts to "consider the agency's views about
the preemptive scope of this statute."
' 140
In any event, since Skidmore's applicability does not depend on construing the
scope of the statutory delegation of agency authority, it appears that we cannot count
avoiding Skidmore as an instance of interpretive avoidance. 14 1 Rather, it amounts to
avoiding a decision about whether courts are constrained to defer to agency
interpretations on non-statutory grounds. If according Skidmore deference to agency
preemption interpretations raises constitutional doubts-as I argue below-then courts
may avoid the question of Skidmore deference by independently determining the
preemptive scope of the statutory provisions that are the subject of the agency's
preemption interpretation. Since avoiding Skidmore does not weigh in favor of any
particular interpretation of those provisions, but rather simply selects a statutory ground
for the decision to avoid having to resolve the constitutional doubts about Skidmore
deference to agency preemption interpretations, this is procedural, not interpretive,
avoidance.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL DOUBTS ABOUT AGENCY PREEMPTION AUTHORITY
So far, I have argued that Riegel and Watters stand for a rule that courts should
avoid deciding whether to accord any deference to agency interpretations of the
preemptive scope of federal statutes and that the rule is a hybrid of interpretive and
procedural avoidance. I turn now to consider some constitutional doubts that might
justify the deference-avoidance rule.
A. Nondelegation
There are a variety of judicial rules precluding particular interpretations of
statutory delegations of authority to administrative agencies for normative reasons.
14 2
One enforces the general (and mostly hypothetical) constitutional bar on delegations of
legislative power by narrowing delegations that might otherwise confer impermissibly
140. l am grateful to Tom McGarity for pointing this out to me.
141. After Mead, determining the scope of the agency's delegated authority may be a threshold requirement
for all deference, not just Chevron. See e.g. Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review
of Agency Action, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1443, 1463-65 (2005); Merrill & Hickman, supra n. 29, at 836; Cass R.
Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. 187, 191 (2006). Chevron's rationale is that Congress has
authority to determine whether courts or agencies will be the default interpretive authority. Thus, under Mead,
the threshold question in the deference inquiry-the decision to apply Chevron or reject it in favor of Skidmore
or independent judicial interpretation-requires determining where Congress intended to vest primary
interpretive authority. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229-231; Hickman & Krueger, supra n. 23, at 1248-49, 1258; see
also Bressman, supra n. 141, at 1466-67 (noting that under Skidmore, courts are default interpreters); Merrill
& Hickman, supra n. 29, at 871 (under Chevron, agencies are default primary interpreters). But avoiding a
preemption-authority-encompassing interpretation of the delegation will not always entail avoiding Skidmore.
Courts often simply apply Skidmore rather than address Mead's statutory threshold question. See Bressman,
supra n. 27, at 605-06; Bressman, supra n. 141, at 1464-69. This may flow from confusing Supreme Court
guidance, or, if the statutory delegation question is difficult, it may be legitimate interpretive avoidance to skip
to Skidmore. Id. at 1451-57, 1464-69. And applying Skidmore itself depends not on a construction of the
agency's delegated authority but on the quality of the agency's work on the specific statutory issue in the case.
142. See generally Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra n. 118; Sunstein, supra n. 104, at 2105-18.
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broad policy-making discretion. 14 3 Judicial use of this avoidance strategy, rather than
full-on enforcement of the constitutional prohibition against delegations of legislative
authority, is justified by: (1) the practical necessity of broad delegations of policy-
making discretion in modem federal governance; and (2) courts' self-professed
incompetence to distinguish permissible from impermissible amounts of delegated
discretion where the question is one of degree. 144
Similar but more specific rules preclude interpreting delegations to include
particularly problematic categories of agency authority-that is, to restrict the delegation
of certain kinds of discretion rather than a certain degree of discretion. Most relevant
here are rules requiring that delegations be construed to exclude agency discretion to take
actions that raise serious constitutional doubts. 14 5 The court has held, for example, that
general delegations should not be construed to confer agency authority to take actions
that arguably impinge the right to travel or that press the outer limits of Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause. 146 If Congress were to specifically delegate agency
authority to, say, regulate in a way that constrains individuals' right to travel, then the
constitutional questions would be (1) whether Congress can impinge the right to travel
and, even if so, (2) whether Congress can delegate that power to an agency. By requiring
clear statutory language to accomplish these kinds of delegations, avoidance-type non-
delegation rules effectively require Congress, rather than the agency, to take the
constitutionally dubious action; they thereby avoid the further question of the
constitutionality of the action if were done clearly by Congress.
14 7
The deference-avoidance rule resembles a nondelegation rule in that it avoids only
the question of deference; the court remains free to independently adopt the same
substantive interpretation of the statute's preemptive that is advanced by the agency, as it
did, for example, in Watters.148 The only requirement is that deference to the agency
cannot be among the reasons for adopting the interpretation. In preemption cases, courts
may avoid Chevron deference by interpreting the statutory delegation to exclude
preemption authority. To be sure, this may result in rejection of the agency's proposed
preemption interpretation on statutory grounds. But because that result is not entailed by
the avoidance rule, the rule's justification must arise from reasons why deference itself-
not the substance of the agency's interpretation claiming deference-is constitutionally
143. See Loving v. U.S., 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996); Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989); see
generally Manning, supra n. 103, at 238-40; Merrill, supra n. 118, at 2102-09. For criticism of the avoidance
approach, see generally Manning, supra n. 103, at 260-61; Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1721, 1761 (2002).
144. See Loving, 517 U.S. at 758 (stating that "[t]o burden Congress with all federal rulemaking would divert
that branch from more pressing issues, and defeat the Framers' design of a workable National Government.");
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371-72) (making a similar point); see also Manning, supra n. 103, at 242 (finding that
"the Court has long doubted its capacity to make principled judgments about such questions of degree");
Merrill, supra n. 118, at 2105.
145. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190-91 (1991); Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra n. 118, at
331. For a more detailed account of these types of rules, see id. at 331-35.
146. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engrs., 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001)
(discussing the commerce clause); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (discussing the right to travel).
147. As Sunstein points out, there are no clear answers here because "Congress has never attempted to do
anything of this sort." Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra n. 118, at 336.
148. See supra nn. 64-77 and accompanying text (discussing Watters, 550 U.S. 1).
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dubious. For Chevron, it may be that delegation to agencies of the authority to issue
binding preemption interpretations is constitutionally dubious. Two candidates for the
source of this doubt are federalism and the constitutional source of Congress's
preemption authority.
I. Federalism
Preemption, particularly where agency action is the purported source of the
preemption, has substantial implications for federalism. 149 The general concern is that
preemption, if not properly constrained, threatens to diminish state government authority
below the constitutionally-required minimum threshold. Courts operationalize
federalism concerns in preemption cases by applying a presumption against preemption
at least where the potentially preempted state law is a matter of "traditional" state
authority. 150 Courts have not settled the presumption's application where agencies
attempt to affect preemption-either through preemption interpretations or directly
preemptive action. 151  Some commentators propose requiring clear statements of
congressional intent to permit agencies to take such actions. 152 They argue that this
approach would promote federalism values because (1) the states are relatively better
situated to protect their interests in Congress than in the administrative process, and (2)
clear preemption delegations would have to traverse the full panoply of legislative
hurdles in Congress, maximizing the states' opportunities to protect themselves and, in
general, decreasing the number of such provisions that actually get enacted.
1 53
This view of federalism's requirements may be correct and the suggested
presumption may be constitutionally justified. But federalism norms do not justify a
general deference-avoidance rule. Presumptions against agency preemption are
asymmetrical in that they only bar deference where the agency advocates preemption.
Presumably most federalism-minded commentators would be fine with deference where
the agency opposes preemption-Eskridge found that agencies do so about one-third of
the time. 154 Imagine that the Riegel Court Chevron-deferred to the FDA regulations
149. See supra n. 25 and accompanying text.
150. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); cf Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485 (suggesting
that the presumption applies in all preemption cases).
151. See Ruthardt, 194 F.3d 176; Young, supra n. 1, at 885. Sunstein observes that, at least once, a court has
applied a federalism-based presumption "that administrative agencies will not be allowed to interpret
ambiguous provisions so as to preempt state law." Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra n. 118, at 331
(citing Natl. Assn. of Reg. Util. Commrs. v. FCC, 880 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
152. E.g. Eskridge, supra n. 3, at 1467-70; John F. Manning, Lessons from a Nondelegation Canon, 83
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1541, 1563-66 (2008); Mendelson, Presumption, supra n. 11, at 706; Young, supra n. 1,
at 886.
153. Eskridge, supra n. 3, at 1459-60; Mendelson, Presumption, supra n. 11, at 716-17; Young, supra n. 1,
at 876-78.
154. Eskridge, supra n. 3, at 1478; see id. at 1470 (arguing that "the Court [is] right to interpret broad
delegations cautiously when they are deployed by agencies to expansively to preempt state law"); Mendelson,
Presumption, supra n. 11, at 724 (stating that a "presumption against agency preemption would, of course,
mean that an agency could not be assumed to have the authority to preempt state law unless there is clear
evidence that Congress so intended.") (emphasis added); Young, supra n. 1, at 885 (focusing on the set of cases
"[w]here the agency does decide the preemption question itself and, in fact, interprets its statute to preempt
state law," since these are the cases where the "Rice [presumption against preemption] and Chevron are in
conflict"); but see Sunstein, supra n. 104, at 2100 (suggesting that nondelegation principles should constrain
Chevron deference to agency interpretations that deny agency authority as well as to those that claim it).
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exempting some state laws from preemption but accorded no deference to the FDA's
amicus brief position favoring broad preemption. 155  No federalism-based clear
statement rule or presumption would be triggered because there would be no
preemption-since the underlying concern is to protect state regulatory authority, the
proposed presumption only applies where deference would result in preemption. 156 But
in Riegel, the Court avoided deferring to both a regulatory interpretation that disfavored
preemption and an amicus brief interpretation that championed preemption. 157 And in
both Riegel and Watters, the Court avoided deference while simultaneously reading the
statutes to effect the very preemption that the agencies proposed.' 5 8 Given these results,
it would be odd to say that the Court avoided deference purely out of concern for
preemption's effects on state regulatory authority.
But we do not want to sell federalism short. Some emphasize that the political and
procedural safeguards for state interests at work in Congress are the primary mechanisms
for protecting state governments. 159 On this view, regardless of the agency's position on
preemption, avoiding Chevron deference is justified wherever a clear delegation is
lacking because clear congressional action in delegating preemption authority to an
agency-not a particular result on the substantive preemption question-is what
federalism requires. 16  The problem is that this approach poses an empirical question:
What kind of statutory language regarding delegations of preemption authority does
Congress typically produce? As I mentioned, there are reasons to think that statutory
ambiguity coupled with general delegations will normally be intended to confer
preemption authority to the agency. 16 1 If that is so, then this process-federalism view
does not, in fact, support construing delegations narrowly to exclude preemption
authority and thereby avoiding deference.
Of course, congressional practice likely is shaped to some extent by the
interpretive rules Congress believes courts will apply; so we might think that adopting a
presumption against reading broad delegations to confer preemption authority on
agencies would force Congress to make its delegations clearer. This argument would be
more forceful if the judicial rules for interpreting delegations of preemption authority
were settled. But since they are not, it is not obvious that current congressional practice
with respect to delegating preemption authority is sufficiently reactive to judicial
doctrine to support the argument that changing doctrine would result in different
legislative results. 162  Broad, vague delegations may simply be what results from
155. See supra nn. 51-63 and accompanying text.
156. Put differently, if federalism norms were not sufficient to warrant rejecting the substance of the
agency's statutory interpretation, it is unlikely that they nevertheless required avoiding deference. Since the
deference avoidance rule applies equally where the agency opposes preemption, it might result in a court
reading a statute to preempt more broadly than an agency believes it does. Where avoidance may actually cash
out to less state autonomy than deference would have done, we should think the federalism advocate would
favor deference.
157. So, too, in Altria, the Court noted, but avoided deferring to, an FTC amicus-brief interpretation
opposing preemption. See Altria, 129 S. Ct. at 552-55; see also supra nn. 12, 63.
158. See supra nn. 55-63, 72-77 and accompanying text.
159. See e.g. Benjamin & Young, supra n. 20, at 2143.
160. Id. at2134.
161. See supra nn. 119-28 and accompanying text.
162. On the lack of settled judicial rules, see supra nn. 18-24, 81 and accompanying text.
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running the idea of agency preemption authority through the political and procedural
safeguards of federalism in Congress. 163  These problems would seem to move the
deference avoidance rule away from a federalism-based justification.
2. Preemption's Authorizing Norms
Avoiding deference nevertheless might be justified if delegations of preemption
authority are dubious in virtue of the constitutional basis for preemption. Congress's
authority to preempt state law may be incidental to its enumerated powers, but the better
account is that preemption is a distinct congressional power with a distinct-and
unsettled-constitutional source. 164  The Supremacy Clause and the Necessary and
Proper Clause are plausible candidates. 16 5  Either option makes for a distinct non-
delegation question. It is not clear that Congress may delegate its Necessary and Proper
Clause authority to agencies at all. It may be that the Necessary and Proper Clause is the
source of Congress's authority to delegate lawmaking power to agencies in the first
place; so it is at least a difficult question-one perhaps worth avoiding-whether
Congress may delegate some aspect of the very power that authorizes delegations.
166
And the Supremacy Clause presents its own puzzles. The Clause is found in Article VI,
quite separate from the "legislative powers" granted in Article I, and it mentions only
courts. Even if the Clause empowers Congress to preempt state law, we might
nevertheless wonder whether the peculiar features of the Clause raise constitutional
doubts about delegations of preemption authority.
Avoiding constitutional doubts about whether Congress may delegate its
preemption authority provides a plausible particularized basis for avoiding deference
questions in preemption cases. Delegations of preemption authority raise constitutional
doubts that are different from-and perhaps more difficult than-those raised by
delegations of ordinary lawmaking functions. Since preemption's constitutional source
is distinct, even if unsettled, the deference-avoidance rule may in principle be limited to
disfavoring delegations of preemption authority. The rule's distinct and limited
normative foundation, in other words, precludes the kind of threat to the general practice
of congressional delegation that has rendered stricter non-delegation rules pragmatically
unacceptable. But there are two other problems with justifying the deference-avoidance
rule based on nondelegation norms. First, Skidmore deference will not always-or even
163. See supra nn. 119-28 and accompanying text.
164. See Pursley, supra n. 1, at 946-51; compare Merrill, supra n. 1, at 736-38 (arguing that preemption is
based on the Supremacy Clause) with Gardbaum, supra n. 1, at 808-12 (arguing that some preemption is based
on the Necessary and Proper Clause).
165. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18 (Necessary and Proper); U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2, cl. 3 (Supremacy).
166. For general doubt about delegating Necessary and Proper Clause power, see Merrill, supra n. 1, at 736-
38. On the Necessary and Proper Clause as the source of Congress's power to delegate, see Larry Alexander &
Saikrishna Prakash, Delegation Really Running Riot, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1035, 1036-30 (2007); Merrill, supra n.
118, at 2129-31. This may provide a reason for rejecting agencies' authority to interpret the scope of their own
jurisdiction-whether agencies have such authority remains contested. See Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss.,
487 U.S. 354, 387 (1988) (Brennan, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (suggesting that "th[e]the Court has
never deferred to an agency's interpretation of . . . its jurisdiction"); see also Abigail R. Moncrieff,
Reincarnating the "Major Questions" Exception to Chevron Deference as a Doctrine of Noninterference (or
Why Massachusetts v. EPA Got it Wrong), 60 Admin. L. Rev. 593, 614-15 (2008); Sunstein, supra n. 104, at
2097-2100.
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often--depend on the statutory delegation. 16 7  If the deference-avoidance rule is to
sweep in Skidmore as well as Chevron, it needs different or additional justification.
Second, and more fundamentally, interpretive canons designed to implement
constitutional nondelegation norms beg, rather than answer, the question of which
institution-agency or court-has authority to bindingly determine the preemptive scope
of the statute. They are normative-value-driven-rules of statutory interpretation; one
cannot say that they operate to disclose the "unambiguous" meaning of the statute under
step 1 of Chevron because their very rationale-that certain kinds of actions should not
be presumed to be authorized by a statute absent a clear statement from Congress-
presupposes statutory ambiguity. 168  Recall that Chevron is based on the idea that
Congress has delegated the authority to interpret statutory ambiguities to agencies rather
than courts. 1 6 9  Chevron's rationale is not limited to strictly textual agency
interpretations; it seems that Congress could also delegate authority to an agency to
apply normative rules of interpretation or to decide to "push the constitutional envelope"
and place a constitutionally dubious interpretation squarely before a court. Additionally,
since there appears to be no basis for thinking that courts will always be superior to
agencies in assessing and applying the values promoted by normative rules of statutory
interpretation, there is no obvious institutional capacity type-argument for presuming that
Congress in general would intend for courts, rather than agencies, to handle the value-
based portion of the interpretive task. 170  Judicial application of normative rules of
interpretation to resolve ambiguous statutory delegation language therefore may invade
interpretive authority Congress in fact intended to commit to the agency.
To the extent that Congress's power to delegate authority over preemption to an
agency is merely constitutionally questionable, and not clearly impressible, there seems
to be no reason for courts to presume that Congress intended for the judiciary, rather than
agencies, to be responsible for applying an interpretive canon disfavoring constructions
of agency delegations as including interpretive authority over preemption. 171  Lisa
Bressman suggests that Congress often does not intend for agencies rather than courts to
167. See supra nn. 131-40 and accompanying text.
168. Mendelson, supra n. 4, at 747-49.
169. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229; Mendelson, supra n. 4, at 747-48; see also supra nn. 104-12.
170. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra n. 118, at 2008-10; Mendelson, supra n. 4, at 750-52; Metzger, supra n.
78. Such arguments may be available for particular rules. Mendelson, for one, argues that a judicial
presumption against agency preemption is justified precisely because agencies are on-balance worse than
courts at assessing federalism impacts. Mendelson, Presumption, supra n. 11, at 718-19. But this rationale for
the presumption, again, asymmetrically calls for rejecting only agency interpretations that favor preemption.
171. As Bressman points out, Congress often delegates complex or controversial issues to agencies mainly
because the issues are complex or controversial. See Bressman, supra n. 27, at 575-80, 603-04. There does
not appear to be any compelling reason to presume Congress would not intend to delegate the controversial
issue of the delegability of preemption authority to an agency. In general, agencies' institutional characteristics
make them more capable of discerning, and more likely to follow, congressional intent in policymaking. See
Bressman, supra n. 27, 602-04, 602 n. 266; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip Frickey, The Supreme Court,
1993 Term-Forward: Law as Equilibrium, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 71-72 (1994). And Congress can exercise
more control over agency decision-making that judicial decision-making. See Bressman, supra n. 27, at 603-
04 (discussing agencies' accountability to Congress and the President and mechanisms available to Congress to
ensure that agency decisions will track legislative preferences). Nothing about the particular question of the
delegability of preemption authority appears to render these reasons for delegating to agencies rather than
courts any less compelling.
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have primary responsibility for applying normative canons of interpretation. 112 She thus
argues that where judicial deference raises constitutional doubts because of the agency's
proposed interpretations raises constitutional doubts, courts should remand the issue to
the agency for reconsideration of the interpretation in the light of the constitutional
norms involved. 173  This may be a viable alternative to judicial avoidance of the
deference question in most instances. And, as Bressman points out, the approach would
have the benefit of focusing agencies and Congress on constitutional issues, which could
lead to more democratically accountable constitutional decision-making. 174 But, since
the implication is that the agency's post-remand interpretation would be entitled to
deference, the agency-remand idea does not seem to resolve the problem where
deference itself, regardless of the substance of the agency's interpretation, is the source
of the constitutional doubt. And I argue that deference to agency preemption
interpretations presents exactly this problem.
But there is another kind of argument for a continuing judicial role. The
Constitution might simply require continuing judicial involvement in preemption
decisions.
B. Judicial Power and Preemption
The common characteristic of Chevron and Skidmore deference is that both
constrain judicial discretion to engage in de novo statutory interpretation-under
Chevron, on the basis of congressional allocation of interpretive authority to an agency;
under Skidmore, on the basis of judicial perception that an agency has superior
expertise. 175 This is unproblematic in general: We accept that Congress may delegate
authority to agencies to interpret ambiguous provisions as a lesser version of its
legislative power; and courts may of course constrain their own discretion where
deferring to an agency interpretation reduces the risk of error. But avoiding both forms
of deference may be justified in preemption cases if constraining judicial interpretive
authority on preemption issues raises constitutional doubts. I think that it does based on
a few observations about constitutional structure and the Supremacy Clause.
It is pretty well-established that Congress possesses the primary constitutional
authority to preempt state law. 176  The more interesting question is whether the
Constitution has anything to say about who should determine whether and how much
state law Congress has in fact preempted. Even if there is reason to doubt that the
Supremacy Clause is the source of Congress's power to preempt; the Clause at least
provides a constitutional rule of decision for these second-order preemption questions-
172. Bressman, supra n.27, at 575-80, 603-04.
173. Id. at 617.
174. See id. at 617-19.
175. Cf Monaghan, supra n. 110, at 5 ("Deference, to be meaningful, imports agency displacement of what
might have been the judicial view res nova-in short, administrative displacement of judicial judgment.")
(emphasis in original).
176. Hence the well-established doctrinal rule that "'[tIhe purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone' of
pre-emption analysis." Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (citing Malone v. White
Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978)) (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)); see
also Pursley, supra n. 1, at 939-40, 945-51.
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it is a rule of priority, viz., federal law governs and state law is preempted if the state law
is "contrary" to federal law. 177 The Clause also may be read to designate courts as the
exclusive venue for application of this decision rule. It clearly authorizes courts to
decide when state law is "contrary" to federal law-in fact, the Clause expressly
mentions only courts. 178  What is substantially less clear is whether any other
governmental actor is authorized to make that decision.
The constitutional structure provides some insight. The Supremacy Clause is quite
separate from the provisions defining Congress's powers. Article I, Section 8
enumerates congressional powers and Article I Section 9 limits them, but the Supremacy
Clause is located in Article VI. To be sure, the Clause provides that constitutionally
permissible laws will be "supreme" over conflicting state laws, but that text in itself
appears to confer no additional power on Congress. The Clause is similarly separated
from the provisions defining the executive power in Article II and the judicial power in
Article III; but in its text the Clause expressly alters the judicial power by prescribing
that where federal and state law conflict, courts must apply federal law. 179 Determining
whether there is a conflict between federal and state law is a necessary analytical
predicate to applying the Supremacy Clause's rule of priority. One plausible reading of
the Supremacy Clause in the context of the rest of the Constitution, therefore, is that it
dedicates to courts the specific task of determining whether state law is "contrary" to
federal law.
There is some support for this reading in the historical record. The Supremacy
Clause is one of the results of the "Great Compromise" between the large and small
states at the Constitutional Convention. Ensuring the supremacy of federal over state
law was a contentious issue and the Convention considered proposals to lodge authority
to enforce federal supremacy with each of the three branches of the national government.
The small states' New Jersey Plan proposed authorizing the executive's use of military
force to coerce state compliance with federal law. 180 This and similar proposals were
roundly rejected. 18 1 More plausibly, the large states' Virginia Plan contained, in its
177. See Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 Geo. L.J. 2085, 2088 (2000); Merrill, supra
n. 1, at 735-37. For doubts about the Supremacy Clause as the source of Congress's preemptive authority,
compare Dinh, supra n. 177, at 2088 (arguing that "the Supremacy Clause itself does not authorize Congress to
preempt state laws") and Gardbaum, supra n. 1, at 773-77 (arguing that authority to constrain state regulatory
authority cannot flow from the Supremacy Clause) with Merrill, supra n. 1, at 737-38 (arguing that the
Supremacy Clause may be construed "as the source of [preemption] authority").
178. U.S. Const. art. VI.
179. Cf Liebman & Ryan, supra n. I l, at 760-74 (discussing the structural relationship between Article
Ill's grant of "arising under" jurisdiction and the Supremacy Clause in the light of events at the Constitutional
Convention).
180. See James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 15, 1787), in The Records of the
Federal Convention of 1787 [hereinafter Farrand's Records] vol. 1, 254 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed., Yale U.
Press 1937).
181. James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 16, 1787), in Farrand's Records vol. I,
supra n. 180, at 255-56 (Randolph's criticisms of the "use of force" provision of the New Jersey Plan); James
Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 18, 1787), in Farrand's Records vol. 1, supra n. 180,
at 284-87 (Hamilton's criticisms of the idea of using force to ensure the supremacy of national law); James
Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 19, 1787), in Farrand's Records vol. 1, supra n. 180,
at 320-22 (Madison's criticisms of the New Jersey Plan, including "use of force" provision); id. at 322
(reporting Conventions' rejection of New Jersey Plan). See also James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional
Convention (May 31, 1787), in Farrand's Records vol. 1, supra n. 180, at 54 (noting Convention's rejection of
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version of the enumeration of congressional powers, a provision authorizing Congress
"to negative all laws passed by the several States, contravening in the opinion of the
national legislature, the articles of . . the Union." 182  Madison supported an even
broader congressional power "to negative" any state law Congress judged "improper." 183
The alternative was leaving to courts the task of invalidating state laws that conflicted
with federal law-Madison opposed this because, in his view, it would take too long in
federal courts and state courts could not be trusted to fairly promote national interests. 
184
Nevertheless, the Convention rejected the congressional negative in favor of an early
version of what would become the Supremacy Clause.185 Arguing against the negative
on the day it was voted down, Pennsylvania's Robert Morris explained that "[a] law that
ought to be negatived will be set aside in the Judiciary department and if that security
should fail, may be repealed by a National law."
' 186
The events surrounding its adoption thus suggest that the Supremacy Clause
"delegate[ed] to judges (state and federal) what previously had been the [congressional
negative's] function of voiding state law contrary to federal law" 187; and some suggest
that maintaining the supremacy of federal law is the central focus of the judicial power
conferred by Article III. A structural consequence of this view would seem to be that
while Congress may control the extent of federal court jurisdiction through its
Exceptions Clause power, neither it nor any other actor may control federal judicial
application of the Supremacy Clause rule where jurisdiction exists. 188 So too, where
state courts exercise the "judicial power" by addressing the application of the Supremacy
Clause-as they are empowered to do by the text of the Clause itself-their judgments
must be independent. On this reading, the Supremacy Clause in its constitutional context
both confers decisional authority on courts and confines that authority to courts alone.
Of course the Supremacy Clause has important applications beyond preemption, but
preemption is where the Clause currently makes most of its appearances. 189  If the
Supremacy Clause rule may be applied solely by courts-that is, if courts have exclusive
constitutional authority to determine whether there is an invalidating conflict between
an earlier "use of force" provision for ensuring supremacy of national law presented in the original version of
the Virginia Plan). See generally Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79
Tfg 2 L. Rev. 1321, 1348-52 (2001).
Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 29, 1787), in Farrand's Records vol. 1, supra n.
180, at 21.
183. James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 8, 1787), in Farrand's Records vol. 1,
supra n. 180, at 164.
184. James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 17, 1787), in Farrand's Records vol. 2,
supra n. 180, at 27-28.
185. See id. at 28-29; see also Bradford R. Clark, Constitutional Compromise and the Supremacy Clause, 83
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1421, 1425-31 (2008); Dinh, supra n. 177, at 2090-91.
186. James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 17, 1787), in Farrand's Records vol. 2,
supra n. 180, at 29.
187. See Liebman & Ryan, supra n. 11, at 730; see also id. at 704; Clark, supra n. 181, at 1434-35; Clark,
supra n. 177, at 1347-48.
188. The Exceptions Clause is at U.S. Const. art. 111, § 2, cl. 2. See Liebman & Ryan, supra n. 111, at 819-
23, 884-85 (stressing "Article Ill's overriding structural objective of maintaining the supremacy of federal law
and neutralizing the effect of contrary law").
189. The status of the Constitution as supreme law is, after all, the basis for constitutional review in general.
Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177-78.
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state and federal law-then it would seem to follow that deference to administrative
agency applications of the rule in the form of preemption interpretations is inconsistent
with the constitutional structure and therefore impermissible.
One might question the conclusion that the constitution gives courts exclusive
authority to implement the Supremacy Clause; a reading more sympathetic to modem
limitations on the courts' decisional capacity might recognize concurrent implementing
authority in the other branches. This points to an important qualification: The
exclusivity of judicial power to apply the Supremacy Clause is limited, by the familiar
terms of the judicial power itself, to the resolution of actual cases-instances where
courts are called upon to issue an authoritative decision on preemption. Other actors
may apply the Clause to make determinations about preemption in the ordinary course of
their business; such determinations will govern unless and until they are challenged in
court. 190 The point is that when such a challenge is made and an authoritative judicial
resolution is called for, one plausible reading of the Supremacy Clause and the
constitutional structure appears to require independent judicial application of the
Supremacy Clause rule. If that is right, then deference to agency preemption
interpretations in the judicial decisionmaking process would, indeed, raise constitutional
doubts.
Grounding deference-avoidance on this particular constitutional doubt makes the
rule seem similar to the Court's approach in the few contexts in which it has rejected
deference on the ground that Congress delegated interpretive authority to courts rather
agencies-examples include defining the scope of statutory causes of action and
interpreting criminal statutes. 19 1 The important difference is that, in preemption cases,
the Constitution rather than Congress allocates the pertinent interpretive authority. This
highlights a more general point. Recognizing what I have called the constitutional
"status" of preemption decisions has a powerful conceptual implication that may
independently warrant avoiding deference. The determinative question in preemption
cases is whether state law, properly construed, is so "contrary" to federal law, properly
construed, as to require invalidation of the state law. While the point is often obscured
by the heavy focus on statutory interpretation in preemption decisions, deciding this
conflict question is constitutional review of the challenged state law. 
192
Judicial invalidation of preempted state laws is, at bottom, an application of the
Supremacy Clause rule. Since Marbury, our practice has been to require independent
judicial decisions on constitutional questions. 193  Yes, judicial constitutional
interpretation is often informed by input from other governmental actors-the
development of the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is a prominent
illustration.1 94 But it has become an axiom of our practice that the ultimate decision
190. Monaghan, supra n. 110, at 5.
191. See e.g. Adams Fruit Co., Inc. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649-50 (1990); Crandon v. U.S., 494 U.S. 152,
177-78 (1990) (Scalia, O'Connor, & Kennedy, JJ., concurring); see also Merrill & Hickman, supra n. 29, at
839-40.
192. See Pursley, supra n. 1, at 917-18, 928-54.
193. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177-78; Liebman & Ryan, supra n. 111, at 820-22; Monaghan, supra n. 110, at 11-
12, 32-34.
194. See e.g. Kennedy v. La., 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2649-50 (2008) (in construing the Eighth Amendment, "the
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whether laws are valid or invalid under the Constitution is to be made independently by
courts. This perhaps explains why, despite having abandoned the unworkable rule that
courts generally should not defer to administrative agencies on "pure" questions of
law, 195 the Court in Smiley v. Citibank1 96 "assume[d] (without deciding)" that the
question of whether a federal statute preempts state law "must always be decided de
novo by the courts."' 197 And most recently, in Levine, the Court emphasized that it has
not yet "deferred to an agency's conclusion that state law is preempted," 198 but rather
has "considered [an] agency's explanation of how state law interfered with" regulations
"as further support for our independent conclusion" about preemption. 199 Consideration
of agency input is fine-in fact, it will often be desirable since deciding whether there is
an impermissible conflict between federal and state law may require complicated policy
determinations that are beyond judicial competence. But deference of any form that
constrains independent judicial decisionmaking would seem to raise a serious
constitutional doubt in the light of our tradition of constitutional review.
A rule that requires avoiding both Chevron and Skidmore deference to agency
preemption interpretations may thus be justified as implementing the constitutional
norms allocating decisional authority on constitutional issues generally, and preemption
in particular, to courts. It is clear that courts have the relevant decisional authority, less
clear that Congress has it, and still less clear that Congress can delegate it to agencies or
that agencies have it independently. There are, of course, counterarguments that might
assuage these constitutional doubts.20 0 But the fact that the doubts exist (and are, in my
view, serious) seems sufficient justification for the deference-avoidance rule. This does
not preclude the application of other normative rules of interpretation in preemption
cases. Non-delegation norms may warrant rejecting Chevron deference where
preemption is not closely tied to the statute's plausible central purpose, for example.
And federalism norms may be vindicated by continuing to apply the presumption against
preemption in interpreting the statutory language to determine whether statutory
preemption in fact occurs.20 1 My point is that the deference-avoidance rule promotes
distinct but not incompatible constitutional norms locating decisional authority with
courts where the preemptive scope of a statute is ambiguous.
Importantly, these are what Young calls "'resistance norms': Constitutional norms
that may be more or less yielding to governmental action, depending on the
circumstances. ' 2° 2 It may turn out to be constitutionally permissible for Congress to
Court has been guided by 'objective indicia of society's standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and
state practice with respect to executions."'); see also Monaghan, supra n. 110, at 34.
195. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944); Monaghan, supra n. 110, at 29-
30; Sunstein, supra n. 104, at 2094-96.
196. 517 U.S. 735.
197. Id. at 744.
198. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1201 (emphasis added).
199. Id. at 1203 (emphasis added).
200. See e.g. Merrill, supra n. 1, at 737-38 (arguing for a construction of the Supremacy Clause entailing
that "all governmental actors-federal and state, executive, legislative, and judicial-have potential
constitutional authority to decide whether the vindication of federal law requires displacement of state law.").
201. Riegel and Watters may be criticized for failing in this regard.
202. See Young, supra n. 34, at 1594.
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expressly delegate to agencies the authority to issue binding preemption interpretations
and thereby require Chevron deference from courts. But to find out, Congress must
squarely present the question by enacting clear and specific statutory language making
such a delegation. If the Court resolves the relevant constitutional doubts in favor of
Chevron deference, then those doubts will no longer provide a reason to avoid Chevron
in future cases, at least where there is a similarly clear statutory delegation. But
constitutional doubts about Skidmore deference would remain. In general, resolving
constitutional doubts in favor of a congressional power to displace judicial decisional
authority on preemption does not entail that courts have a coextensive power to abdicate
that authority on other grounds. Even under our hypothetical clear delegation statute,
although the agency might claim Skidmore deference for an informal preemption
interpretation, we might think that Congress only intended deference for interpretations
bearing the "force of law" and thus that Skidmore deference remains constitutionally
doubtful. In any event, substantive resolution of constitutional doubts about the
propriety of deference where there is an explicit allocation of interpretive authority on
preemption is a question for another day.
20 3
V. CONCLUSION
The deference-avoidance rule avoids constitutional doubts generated by treating
agency interpretations as a binding constraint on judicial interpretation of a statute's
preemptive scope. The constitutional separation of powers is thought to have its own
normative force-the rule's justification thus does not depend on the fact that it may
advance federalism interests by restricting preemptive decisionmaking to Congress. Nor
does it depend on the constitutional norm that appears to restrict the initial exercise of
preemptive authority to Congress, although the Chevron-avoiding part of the rule may
find alternate justification there. It is sufficient to support the Court's approach in Riegel
and Watters that the Constitution appears to grant decisional authority to courts where
the question is whether state law has, in fact, been preempted.
203. Judicial enforcement of separation-of-powers norms has been inconsistent. See e.g. Martin H. Redish
& Elizabeth J. Cisar, "IfAngels Were to Govern ": The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers
Theory, 41 Duke L.J. 449, 450 (1991); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-
Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency? 72 Cornell L. Rev. 488, 489 (1987).
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